Self-update

spt-core keeps itself current without ever interrupting your agents, and without trusting anything unsigned.

The invariant

No endpoint process terminates or suspends during a self-update. The daemon’s broker (holding PTYs, child processes, sockets) stays up; the brain (all logic) swaps under it. A hosted session’s process id and byte stream are identical before and after.

The trust chain

• Every release ships SignedRelease metadata: an Ed25519 signature over the release’s artifact digests.
• Every binary embeds the two-key trusted set — an active primary and a never-used offline recovery key. Verification requires a valid signature from a trusted key and a matching artifact digest; an unverified binary never reaches the apply step.
• Losing the primary key is a non-event: the next release is signed with the recovery key (already trusted by every deployed binary) and rotates in a fresh primary.
• Adapters sign their own content. A file_pull adapter update is verified against the adapter author’s key from its manifest; a delegated update is trusted only when the manifest attests the delegated updater verifies its own content (self_verifies). spt-core’s release keys never vouch for adapter bytes.

How updates move

Peer-propagated: one node fetches a release; paired nodes offer/fetch staged releases from each other, each verifying independently before staging. Updating is consent-gated by default — a notification surfaces at your most-recently-active endpoint, and spt update apply is the explicit ack (it re-verifies the staged release before touching the live daemon). Full-auto is an explicit opt-in.

After self-updating, spt-core ripple-updates registered adapters through each manifest’s declared [update] avenue.

Commands

spt update · the consent notification flow (spt notif) — CLI reference.