Prompt:
<task-notification>
<task-id>bgl0rt8u3</task-id>
<tool-use-id>toolu_01Eaf5jj3VxsKrnhKjT8CeB5</tool-use-id>
<output-file>C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\bgl0rt8u3.output</output-file>
<status>completed</status>
<summary>Background command "Test wansend in spt binary target" completed (exit code 0)</summary>
</task-notification>


Bash

Check wansend test results


test result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 86 filtered out; finished in 0.38s


Fix 1: Non-admin daemon spawn (both OSes)

Daemon must always run unelevated in invoking user's universe. Windows: elevated command spawns elevated daemon → pipes deny unelevated clients → later spt spawn attempts get bind Access-denied. Linux: sudo'd command spawns root daemon/root state in user home. Fix: de-elevated spawn (Windows: unelevated shell token; Linux: drop to SUDO_UID) and/or pipe SDDL granting user session.

Fix 2: Ghost registry row eviction

Dead node identity rows persist forever in registry snapshots (no TTL/eviction; only per-(endpoint,node) epoch lease supersedes). Poisons bare-id resolution with phantom AcrossNodes ambiguity. Fix: decay rows unrefreshed for N pump cadences (reuse heard-map from D2); consider trust-prune verb.

Ride-along: AMBIGUOUS render as copy-paste targets

Resolution refusals should print valid qualified targets (sergey@gravity-linux, sergey@03854a12), labels preferred — not AcrossNodes([..hex..]) debug dump. Render fix at wansend/CLI boundary.


Fix 3 green. Wire deelevate into daemon:


<tool_use_error>File has not been read yet. Read it first before writing to it.</tool_use_error>

Error: File has not been read yet. Read it first before writing to it.


Edit

# Per-frame link auth on the same-node shell channels (CONTEXT local-link
# authentication): HMAC-SHA256 over the token-derived link key (M5-D3b).
hmac = "0.12"

# Per-frame link auth on the same-node shell channels (CONTEXT local-link
# authentication): HMAC-SHA256 over the token-derived link key (M5-D3b).
hmac = "0.12"

# De-elevated daemon spawn (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7, REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN):
# the sudo-invoker drop (geteuid/setuid/setgroups/getpwuid_r). Matches the
# workspace's existing libc usage (spt, spt-msg, spt-store); the Windows half
# uses raw advapi32 externs (the daemon.rs detached_no_inherit posture).
[target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
libc = "0.2"


Proceed with bug root cause analysis and fixes


100	//! (R-ARCH-2).
101	//!
102	//! [`Envelope`]: frame::Envelope
103	//! [`Hello`]: frame::Hello
104	//! [`DaemonTransport`]: transport::DaemonTransport
105
106	pub mod access;
107	pub mod adapter_update;
108	pub mod applyhost;
109	pub mod attach;
110	pub mod brain;
111	pub mod broker;
112	pub mod codec;
113	pub mod config;
114	pub mod consent;
115	pub mod daemon;
116	pub mod digest;
117	pub mod digesthub;
118	pub mod dispatch;
119	pub mod effect;
120	pub mod endpoint;
121	pub mod frame;
122	pub mod grants;
123	pub mod lifecycle;
124	pub mod linkhost;

//! (R-ARCH-2).
//!
//! [`Envelope`]: frame::Envelope
//! [`Hello`]: frame::Hello
//! [`DaemonTransport`]: transport::DaemonTransport

pub mod access;
pub mod adapter_update;
pub mod applyhost;
pub mod attach;
pub mod brain;
pub mod broker;
pub mod codec;
pub mod config;
pub mod consent;
pub mod daemon;
pub mod digest;
pub mod digesthub;
pub mod dispatch;
pub mod effect;
pub mod endpoint;
pub mod frame;
pub mod grants;
pub mod lifecycle;
pub mod linkhost;


pub mod daemon;
pub mod deelevate;
pub mod digest;


The file C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\crates\spt-daemon\src\lib.rs has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)

pub mod daemon;
pub mod deelevate;
pub mod digest;

pub mod config;
pub mod consent;
pub mod daemon;
+pub mod deelevate;
pub mod digest;
pub mod digesthub;
pub mod dispatch;


Bash

grep -n "hmac" C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core/crates/spt-daemon/Cargo.toml

Locate hmac line in Cargo.toml


45:hmac = "0.12"


40	# SHA-256 binds the signed release metadata to the actual binary bytes
41	# (artifact digest) so the signature covers the binary, not just the manifest.
42	sha2 = "0.10"
43	# Per-frame link auth on the same-node shell channels (CONTEXT local-link
44	# authentication): HMAC-SHA256 over the token-derived link key (M5-D3b).
45	hmac = "0.12"
46
47	[dev-dependencies]
48	tempfile = "3"
49	# Integration tests are separate crates and do not inherit the lib's deps, so the
50	# B8 digest int-test re-declares the two it touches directly: the manifest seam
51	# (PtyDigest) and the perch-path/history resolution it asserts persistence against.
52	spt-runtime = { path = "../spt-runtime" }
53	spt-store = { path = "../spt-store" }
54	# The D4a net-broker int-test constructs identities + relay policies directly.
55	spt-proto = { path = "../spt-proto" }
56	spt-net = { path = "../spt-net" }
57	# The D5a wanmsg int-test asserts spool formatting through the spt-msg surface.
58	spt-msg = { path = "../spt-msg" }
59

# SHA-256 binds the signed release metadata to the actual binary bytes
# (artifact digest) so the signature covers the binary, not just the manifest.
sha2 = "0.10"
# Per-frame link auth on the same-node shell channels (CONTEXT local-link
# authentication): HMAC-SHA256 over the token-derived link key (M5-D3b).
hmac = "0.12"

[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3"
# Integration tests are separate crates and do not inherit the lib's deps, so the
# B8 digest int-test re-declares the two it touches directly: the manifest seam
# (PtyDigest) and the perch-path/history resolution it asserts persistence against.
spt-runtime = { path = "../spt-runtime" }
spt-store = { path = "../spt-store" }
# The D4a net-broker int-test constructs identities + relay policies directly.
spt-proto = { path = "../spt-proto" }
spt-net = { path = "../spt-net" }
# The D5a wanmsg int-test asserts spool formatting through the spt-msg surface.
spt-msg = { path = "../spt-msg" }


Edit

# Per-frame link auth on the same-node shell channels (CONTEXT local-link
# authentication): HMAC-SHA256 over the token-derived link key (M5-D3b).
hmac = "0.12"

[dev-dependencies]

# Per-frame link auth on the same-node shell channels (CONTEXT local-link
# authentication): HMAC-SHA256 over the token-derived link key (M5-D3b).
hmac = "0.12"

# De-elevated daemon spawn (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7, REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN):
# the sudo-invoker drop (geteuid/setuid/setgroups/getpwuid_r). Matches the
# workspace's existing libc usage (spt, spt-msg, spt-store); the Windows half
# uses raw advapi32 externs (the daemon.rs detached_no_inherit posture).
[target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
libc = "0.2"

[dev-dependencies]


The file C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\crates\spt-daemon\Cargo.toml has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)

# Per-frame link auth on the same-node shell channels (CONTEXT local-link
# authentication): HMAC-SHA256 over the token-derived link key (M5-D3b).
hmac = "0.12"

# De-elevated daemon spawn (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7, REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN):
# the sudo-invoker drop (geteuid/setuid/setgroups/getpwuid_r). Matches the
# workspace's existing libc usage (spt, spt-msg, spt-store); the Windows half
# uses raw advapi32 externs (the daemon.rs detached_no_inherit posture).
[target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
libc = "0.2"

[dev-dependencies]

[package]
name = "spt-daemon"
version.workspace = true
edition = "2021"
publish = false
description = "spt-core broker/brain daemon (M3b): the per-machine supervisor process. A stable broker kernel holds the un-transferable resources (PTY masters from spt-term, harness children, sockets) while a restartable brain holds all logic; a versioned local IPC lets a newer brain talk to an older broker so a self-update swaps the brain with zero endpoint interruption (ADR-0004). Internal supervisor (NOT public SDK, R-ARCH-2) — the `spt` binary is a thin CLI over it. B0 lands the crate + the versioned local-IPC transport."

[dependencies]
# Layer-below set (R-ARCH-1 acyclic): …→spt-live→spt-daemon→spt. The broker
# re-hosts spt-term PTYs + the spt-live lifecycle seams; these edges fix the
# crate's position in the workspace layering. Tasks B1–B8 consume them.
spt-proto = { path = "../spt-proto" }
spt-store = { path = "../spt-store" }
spt-msg = { path = "../spt-msg" }
spt-runtime = { path = "../spt-runtime" }
spt-term = { path = "../spt-term" }
spt-live = { path = "../spt-live" }
# D4 (ADR-0004 §B): the broker owns the live iroh endpoint + QUIC connections so
# they survive a brain restart. spt-net provides the *mechanism* (NetEndpoint);
# the broker hosts the *process* (nethost::NetHost). Default features keep the
# `net` transport on — the daemon is the reference consumer.
spt-net = { path = "../spt-net" }
# The broker is otherwise sync/thread-based; iroh requires tokio, so the broker
# hosts a dedicated runtime on named worker threads (QUIC objects never leave it).
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["rt-multi-thread"] }
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = { version = "1", features = ["preserve_order"] }
# PTY output is arbitrary bytes; the forward-compat JSON envelope carries it as
# a base64 string in the payload rather than forking the codec for binary.
base64 = "0.22"
# Cross-platform local IPC: named pipe (Windows) / Unix-domain socket (unix)
# behind one API — the OS-split substrate the DaemonTransport trait wraps,
# mirroring how spt-term abstracts ConPTY vs forkpty behind SessionSurface.
interprocess = "2"
# Self-update release signing (C1, REQ-UPD-2): pure-Rust Ed25519 — no C/asm
# build deps, clean cross-compile on win+linux (clean-room posture, ADR-0004 §D).
# `rand_core` lets a release-tooling caller mint a keypair; tests use the
# deterministic `from_bytes` ctor (no RNG).
ed25519-dalek = "2"
# SHA-256 binds the signed release metadata to the actual binary bytes
# (artifact digest) so the signature covers the binary, not just the manifest.
sha2 = "0.10"
# Per-frame link auth on the same-node shell channels (CONTEXT local-link
# authentication): HMAC-SHA256 over the token-derived link key (M5-D3b).
hmac = "0.12"

[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3"
# Integration tests are separate crates and do not inherit the lib's deps, so the
# B8 digest int-test re-declares the two it touches directly: the manifest seam
# (PtyDigest) and the perch-path/history resolution it asserts persistence against.
spt-runtime = { path = "../spt-runtime" }
spt-store = { path = "../spt-store" }
# The D4a net-broker int-test constructs identities + relay policies directly.
spt-proto = { path = "../spt-proto" }
spt-net = { path = "../spt-net" }
# The D5a wanmsg int-test asserts spool formatting through the spt-msg surface.
spt-msg = { path = "../spt-msg" }

+# De-elevated daemon spawn (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7, REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN):

+# the sudo-invoker drop (geteuid/setuid/setgroups/getpwuid_r). Matches the

+# workspace's existing libc usage (spt, spt-msg, spt-store); the Windows half

+# uses raw advapi32 externs (the daemon.rs detached_no_inherit posture).


/// **Windows handle-inheritance guard (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.6).** A caller may
/// capture this process's stdout/stderr through a pipe (`Command::output()`, a
/// harness hook reading the command's output). On Windows `CreateProcess` runs
/// with `bInheritHandles = TRUE`, so the long-lived daemon would inherit that
/// pipe's write end and hold it open forever — the capturing reader never sees
/// EOF and hangs. Worse, inheritable pipe handles flow through EVERY
/// `bInheritHandles = TRUE` hop: stripping only this process's *std* handles
/// (the first guard shipped here) still leaked a grandparent capture's pipe
/// sitting in our handle table as a stray. So detached long-lived children are
/// spawned with **`bInheritHandles = FALSE`** ([`detached_no_inherit`]) — zero
/// handles flow, whatever the ancestry. Unix is immune (Rust marks pipe fds
/// `CLOEXEC`) and keeps the plain `Command` path.
fn spawn_detached() -> io::Result<()> {
    let exe = std::env::current_exe()?;
    #[cfg(windows)]
    {
        detached_no_inherit(&exe.to_string_lossy(), &["daemon".to_string()])?;
        Ok(())
    }
    #[cfg(unix)]
    {
        Command::new(exe)
            .arg("daemon")
            .stdin(Stdio::null())
            .stdout(Stdio::null())
            .stderr(Stdio::null())
            .spawn()?;
        Ok(())
    }
}

/// **Windows handle-inheritance guard (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.6).** A caller may
/// capture this process's stdout/stderr through a pipe (`Command::output()`, a
/// harness hook reading the command's output). On Windows `CreateProcess` runs
/// with `bInheritHandles = TRUE`, so the long-lived daemon would inherit that
/// pipe's write end and hold it open forever — the capturing reader never sees
/// EOF and hangs. Worse, inheritable pipe handles flow through EVERY
/// `bInheritHandles = TRUE` hop: stripping only this process's *std* handles
/// (the first guard shipped here) still leaked a grandparent capture's pipe
/// sitting in our handle table as a stray. So detached long-lived children are
/// spawned with **`bInheritHandles = FALSE`** ([`detached_no_inherit`]) — zero
/// handles flow, whatever the ancestry. Unix is immune (Rust marks pipe fds
/// `CLOEXEC`) and keeps the plain `Command` path.
///
/// **Elevation guard (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7).** The daemon must ALWAYS run
/// unelevated in the invoking user's universe, whichever command spawns it:
/// an elevated spawner (Windows UAC, `sudo`) de-elevates the child here —
/// Windows via the UAC linked token ([`crate::deelevate::spawn_deelevated`];
/// no handle inheritance by construction, so 5.6 holds on that path too),
/// unix by dropping the child to `SUDO_UID`/`SUDO_GID` with the invoker's
/// `HOME`. When no unelevated identity exists (UAC off, genuine root), the
/// spawn proceeds as-is with a loud warning — a consistent universe, never a
/// torn one.
// [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]
fn spawn_detached() -> io::Result<()> {
    let exe = std::env::current_exe()?;
    #[cfg(windows)]
    {
        let exe = exe.to_string_lossy();
        let args = ["daemon".to_string()];
        match crate::deelevate::spawn_deelevated(&exe, &args) {
            Ok(Some(_pid)) => return Ok(()), // de-elevated child running
            Ok(None) => {
                if crate::deelevate::is_elevated() {
                    eprintln!(
                        "ELEVATED_DAEMON: no unelevated linked token — daemon inherits the \
                         elevated token (unelevated clients may be denied)"
                    );
                }
            }
            Err(e) => eprintln!("DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — falling back to inherited token"),
        }
        detached_no_inherit(&exe, &args)?;
        Ok(())
    }
    #[cfg(unix)]
    {
        let mut cmd = Command::new(exe);
        cmd.arg("daemon").stdin(Stdio::null()).stdout(Stdio::null()).stderr(Stdio::null());
        if let Some(invoker) = crate::deelevate::sudo_invoker() {
            // Drop the child to the sudo invoker: std clears supplementary
            // groups and orders setgid-before-setuid when uid is set.
            use std::os::unix::process::CommandExt;
            invoker.stamp_env(&mut cmd);
            cmd.uid(invoker.uid).gid(invoker.gid);
        }
        cmd.spawn()?;
        Ok(())
    }
}


The file C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\crates\spt-daemon\src\daemon.rs has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)

/// **Windows handle-inheritance guard (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.6).** A caller may
/// capture this process's stdout/stderr through a pipe (`Command::output()`, a
/// harness hook reading the command's output). On Windows `CreateProcess` runs
/// with `bInheritHandles = TRUE`, so the long-lived daemon would inherit that
/// pipe's write end and hold it open forever — the capturing reader never sees
/// EOF and hangs. Worse, inheritable pipe handles flow through EVERY
/// `bInheritHandles = TRUE` hop: stripping only this process's *std* handles
/// (the first guard shipped here) still leaked a grandparent capture's pipe
/// sitting in our handle table as a stray. So detached long-lived children are
/// spawned with **`bInheritHandles = FALSE`** ([`detached_no_inherit`]) — zero
/// handles flow, whatever the ancestry. Unix is immune (Rust marks pipe fds
/// `CLOEXEC`) and keeps the plain `Command` path.
fn spawn_detached() -> io::Result<()> {
    let exe = std::env::current_exe()?;
    #[cfg(windows)]
    {
        detached_no_inherit(&exe.to_string_lossy(), &["daemon".to_string()])?;
        Ok(())
    }
    #[cfg(unix)]
    {
        Command::new(exe)
            .arg("daemon")
            .stdin(Stdio::null())
            .stdout(Stdio::null())
            .stderr(Stdio::null())
            .spawn()?;
        Ok(())
    }
}

/// **Windows handle-inheritance guard (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.6).** A caller may
/// capture this process's stdout/stderr through a pipe (`Command::output()`, a
/// harness hook reading the command's output). On Windows `CreateProcess` runs
/// with `bInheritHandles = TRUE`, so the long-lived daemon would inherit that
/// pipe's write end and hold it open forever — the capturing reader never sees
/// EOF and hangs. Worse, inheritable pipe handles flow through EVERY
/// `bInheritHandles = TRUE` hop: stripping only this process's *std* handles
/// (the first guard shipped here) still leaked a grandparent capture's pipe
/// sitting in our handle table as a stray. So detached long-lived children are
/// spawned with **`bInheritHandles = FALSE`** ([`detached_no_inherit`]) — zero
/// handles flow, whatever the ancestry. Unix is immune (Rust marks pipe fds
/// `CLOEXEC`) and keeps the plain `Command` path.
///
/// **Elevation guard (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7).** The daemon must ALWAYS run
/// unelevated in the invoking user's universe, whichever command spawns it:
/// an elevated spawner (Windows UAC, `sudo`) de-elevates the child here —
/// Windows via the UAC linked token ([`crate::deelevate::spawn_deelevated`];
/// no handle inheritance by construction, so 5.6 holds on that path too),
/// unix by dropping the child to `SUDO_UID`/`SUDO_GID` with the invoker's
/// `HOME`. When no unelevated identity exists (UAC off, genuine root), the
/// spawn proceeds as-is with a loud warning — a consistent universe, never a
/// torn one.
// [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]
fn spawn_detached() -> io::Result<()> {
    let exe = std::env::current_exe()?;
    #[cfg(windows)]
    {
        let exe = exe.to_string_lossy();
        let args = ["daemon".to_string()];
        match crate::deelevate::spawn_deelevated(&exe, &args) {
            Ok(Some(_pid)) => return Ok(()), // de-elevated child running
            Ok(None) => {
                if crate::deelevate::is_elevated() {
                    eprintln!(
                        "ELEVATED_DAEMON: no unelevated linked token — daemon inherits the \
                         elevated token (unelevated clients may be denied)"
                    );
                }
            }
            Err(e) => eprintln!("DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — falling back to inherited token"),
        }
        detached_no_inherit(&exe, &args)?;
        Ok(())
    }
    #[cfg(unix)]
    {
        let mut cmd = Command::new(exe);
        cmd.arg("daemon").stdin(Stdio::null()).stdout(Stdio::null()).stderr(Stdio::null());
        if let Some(invoker) = crate::deelevate::sudo_invoker() {
            // Drop the child to the sudo invoker: std clears supplementary
            // groups and orders setgid-before-setuid when uid is set.
            use std::os::unix::process::CommandExt;
            invoker.stamp_env(&mut cmd);
            cmd.uid(invoker.uid).gid(invoker.gid);
        }
        cmd.spawn()?;
        Ok(())
    }
}

+/// **Elevation guard (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7).** The daemon must ALWAYS run

+/// unelevated in the invoking user's universe, whichever command spawns it:

+/// an elevated spawner (Windows UAC, `sudo`) de-elevates the child here —

+/// Windows via the UAC linked token ([`crate::deelevate::spawn_deelevated`];

+/// no handle inheritance by construction, so 5.6 holds on that path too),

+/// unix by dropping the child to `SUDO_UID`/`SUDO_GID` with the invoker's

+/// `HOME`. When no unelevated identity exists (UAC off, genuine root), the

+/// spawn proceeds as-is with a loud warning — a consistent universe, never a

-        detached_no_inherit(&exe.to_string_lossy(), &["daemon".to_string()])?;

+        let exe = exe.to_string_lossy();

+        let args = ["daemon".to_string()];

+        match crate::deelevate::spawn_deelevated(&exe, &args) {

+            Ok(Some(_pid)) => return Ok(()), // de-elevated child running

+                if crate::deelevate::is_elevated() {

+                        "ELEVATED_DAEMON: no unelevated linked token — daemon inherits the \

+                         elevated token (unelevated clients may be denied)"

+            Err(e) => eprintln!("DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — falling back to inherited token"),

+        detached_no_inherit(&exe, &args)?;

+        let mut cmd = Command::new(exe);

+        cmd.arg("daemon").stdin(Stdio::null()).stdout(Stdio::null()).stderr(Stdio::null());

+        if let Some(invoker) = crate::deelevate::sudo_invoker() {

+            // Drop the child to the sudo invoker: std clears supplementary

+            // groups and orders setgid-before-setuid when uid is set.

+            use std::os::unix::process::CommandExt;

+            invoker.stamp_env(&mut cmd);

+            cmd.uid(invoker.uid).gid(invoker.gid);


Critical check — socket names per-home; elevated CLI's universe vs de-elevated child's:


1	//! Canonical per-machine daemon endpoint names + pid path (B6).
2	//!
3	//! The daemon binds two local-IPC listeners — the broker (PTY hosting, B1/B2)
4	//! and the seed-control channel (B6) — under names derived from the active
5	//! `spt_home`. Deriving from `spt_home` keeps each isolated home (a test's
6	//! `SPT_HOME` override, a per-user install) on its own daemon, so parallel test
7	//! processes never collide on one machine while a real install gets one stable
8	//! per-home daemon. The auto-start spawn inherits `SPT_HOME`, so the spawned
9	//! daemon computes the **same** names as the client that started it — that
10	//! shared derivation is the whole of the rendezvous (no registry lookup).
11	// [impl->REQ-DAEMON-3]
12
13	use std::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
14	use std::path::PathBuf;
15
16	use spt_store::perch::spt_home;
17
18	/// A deterministic short tag for the active spt home. `DefaultHasher::new()` is
19	/// seeded with fixed keys (it is **not** randomized like `RandomState`), so the
20	/// tag is stable across processes that share the same `spt_home` — exactly what
21	/// the auto-start handshake needs (the spawned daemon must independently derive
22	/// the launching client's socket name).
23	fn home_tag() -> String {
24	    let mut h = std::collections::hash_map::DefaultHasher::new();
25	    spt_home().hash(&mut h);
26	    format!("{:016x}", h.finish())
27	}
28
29	/// The seed-control listener name (B6): the channel `api seed`/`api listen`
30	/// connect to for the in-memory seed map. It is also the daemon's liveness
31	/// anchor — present for the daemon's whole lifetime.
32	pub fn seed_socket_name() -> String {
33	    format!("spt-daemon-seed-{}.sock", home_tag())
34	}
35
36	/// The broker listener name (B1/B2): PTY hosting + gapless handoff.
37	pub fn broker_socket_name() -> String {
38	    format!("spt-daemon-broker-{}.sock", home_tag())
39	}
40
41	/// The digest-control listener name (B8): the channel `spt digest <id>` connects
42	/// to for a snapshot pull or a delta-stream subscribe (ADR-0008 / REQ-TERM-4).
43	pub fn digest_socket_name() -> String {
44	    format!("spt-daemon-digest-{}.sock", home_tag())
45	}
46
47	/// The daemon's pid file: `<spt_home>/daemon.pid`. Best-effort breadcrumb the
48	/// running daemon writes on start — discoverable for management/cleanup. Not a
49	/// liveness signal (liveness is the seed-control ping); a stale pid here is
50	/// harmless because callers probe the socket, never this file.
51	pub fn daemon_pid_path() -> PathBuf {
52	    spt_home().join("daemon.pid")
53	}
54

//! Canonical per-machine daemon endpoint names + pid path (B6).
//!
//! The daemon binds two local-IPC listeners — the broker (PTY hosting, B1/B2)
//! and the seed-control channel (B6) — under names derived from the active
//! `spt_home`. Deriving from `spt_home` keeps each isolated home (a test's
//! `SPT_HOME` override, a per-user install) on its own daemon, so parallel test
//! processes never collide on one machine while a real install gets one stable
//! per-home daemon. The auto-start spawn inherits `SPT_HOME`, so the spawned
//! daemon computes the **same** names as the client that started it — that
//! shared derivation is the whole of the rendezvous (no registry lookup).
// [impl->REQ-DAEMON-3]

use std::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
use std::path::PathBuf;

use spt_store::perch::spt_home;

/// A deterministic short tag for the active spt home. `DefaultHasher::new()` is
/// seeded with fixed keys (it is **not** randomized like `RandomState`), so the
/// tag is stable across processes that share the same `spt_home` — exactly what
/// the auto-start handshake needs (the spawned daemon must independently derive
/// the launching client's socket name).
fn home_tag() -> String {
    let mut h = std::collections::hash_map::DefaultHasher::new();
    spt_home().hash(&mut h);
    format!("{:016x}", h.finish())
}

/// The seed-control listener name (B6): the channel `api seed`/`api listen`
/// connect to for the in-memory seed map. It is also the daemon's liveness
/// anchor — present for the daemon's whole lifetime.
pub fn seed_socket_name() -> String {
    format!("spt-daemon-seed-{}.sock", home_tag())
}

/// The broker listener name (B1/B2): PTY hosting + gapless handoff.
pub fn broker_socket_name() -> String {
    format!("spt-daemon-broker-{}.sock", home_tag())
}

/// The digest-control listener name (B8): the channel `spt digest <id>` connects
/// to for a snapshot pull or a delta-stream subscribe (ADR-0008 / REQ-TERM-4).
pub fn digest_socket_name() -> String {
    format!("spt-daemon-digest-{}.sock", home_tag())
}

/// The daemon's pid file: `<spt_home>/daemon.pid`. Best-effort breadcrumb the
/// running daemon writes on start — discoverable for management/cleanup. Not a
/// liveness signal (liveness is the seed-control ping); a stale pid here is
/// harmless because callers probe the socket, never this file.
pub fn daemon_pid_path() -> PathBuf {
    spt_home().join("daemon.pid")
}


Fix 2: Ghost registry row eviction


1	//! `spt` — the single spt-core binary. A **thin** command layer over `spt-msg`:
2	//! it owns I/O (stdin/stdout/stderr) and process exit codes; all messaging
3	//! logic lives in the crate (clean-room separation per the M1 plan).
4	//!
5	//! Subcommands (REQ-MSG-2 stable surface): `send` · `ring` · `ready` · `poll` ·
6	//! `list` · `stop` · `whoami`. The harness-contract inbound surface lives under
7	//! the `api` group (REQ-API-1), dispatched from [`api`].
8	// [impl->REQ-MSG-2]
9
10	mod api;
11	mod cli;
12	mod elevation;
13	mod roster;
14	mod wansend;
15
16	#[cfg(test)]
17	mod testutil;
18
19	fn main() {
20	    let code = cli::run();
21	    std::process::exit(code);
22	}
23

//! `spt` — the single spt-core binary. A **thin** command layer over `spt-msg`:
//! it owns I/O (stdin/stdout/stderr) and process exit codes; all messaging
//! logic lives in the crate (clean-room separation per the M1 plan).
//!
//! Subcommands (REQ-MSG-2 stable surface): `send` · `ring` · `ready` · `poll` ·
//! `list` · `stop` · `whoami`. The harness-contract inbound surface lives under
//! the `api` group (REQ-API-1), dispatched from [`api`].
// [impl->REQ-MSG-2]

mod api;
mod cli;
mod elevation;
mod roster;
mod wansend;

#[cfg(test)]
mod testutil;

fn main() {
    let code = cli::run();
    std::process::exit(code);
}


crates\spt\src\elevation.rs:50:pub fn gate_for(elevation: Elevation) -> Gate {
crates\spt\src\elevation.rs:136:        assert_eq!(gate_for(Elevation::Elevated), Gate::Show);
crates\spt\src\elevation.rs:137:        assert_eq!(gate_for(Elevation::NotElevated), Gate::Fallback);
crates\spt\src\elevation.rs:138:        assert_eq!(gate_for(Elevation::Unknown), Gate::Fallback);
crates\spt\src\cli.rs:1560:        Resolved::Subnet { name, seed, minted } => match elevation::gate_for(elevation) {
crates\spt\src\cli.rs:1631:        Resolved::Subnet { name, seed, minted } => match elevation::gate_for(elevation) {
crates\spt\src\cli.rs:1731:    let result = decide_show_code(resolved, now_unix(), elevation::current());
crates\spt\src\cli.rs:1743:    let result = decide_create(resolved, now_unix(), elevation::current());
crates\spt\src\cli.rs:2087:    match elevation::gate_for(elevation) {
crates\spt\src\cli.rs:2122:    if let Some(msg) = join_elevation_refusal(elevation::current()) {


/// Query the OS for this process's elevation level. `cfg`-split; an unsupported
/// platform or a failed OS call returns [`Elevation::Unknown`] (→ fail safe).
// [impl->REQ-PAIR-6]
pub fn current() -> Elevation {
    detect()
}

/// Set when the process **started** elevated and deliberately de-elevated
/// itself at entry (the sudo-invoker drop, KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7): the user
/// proved privilege by sudo'ing; dropping to their own identity for state
/// safety must not also revoke the gate they paid for. Process-local by
/// design — never an env var, which any unprivileged caller could forge.
// [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]
static ELEVATION_PROVEN: std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool =
    std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false);

/// Record that elevation was positively confirmed before a deliberate
/// in-process de-elevation (called ONLY from the main-entry sudo drop).
pub fn mark_proven() {
    ELEVATION_PROVEN.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
}

/// Query the OS for this process's elevation level. `cfg`-split; an unsupported
/// platform or a failed OS call returns [`Elevation::Unknown`] (→ fail safe).
/// A process that proved elevation at entry and then dropped (the 5.7 sudo
/// de-elevation) still reads `Elevated` — the proof, not the current euid,
/// is what the gates authorize on.
// [impl->REQ-PAIR-6]
pub fn current() -> Elevation {
    if ELEVATION_PROVEN.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
        return Elevation::Elevated;
    }
    detect()
}


The file C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\crates\spt\src\elevation.rs has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)

/// Set when the process **started** elevated and deliberately de-elevated
/// itself at entry (the sudo-invoker drop, KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7): the user
/// proved privilege by sudo'ing; dropping to their own identity for state
/// safety must not also revoke the gate they paid for. Process-local by
/// design — never an env var, which any unprivileged caller could forge.
// [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]
static ELEVATION_PROVEN: std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool =
    std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false);

/// Record that elevation was positively confirmed before a deliberate
/// in-process de-elevation (called ONLY from the main-entry sudo drop).
pub fn mark_proven() {
    ELEVATION_PROVEN.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
}

/// Query the OS for this process's elevation level. `cfg`-split; an unsupported
/// platform or a failed OS call returns [`Elevation::Unknown`] (→ fail safe).
/// A process that proved elevation at entry and then dropped (the 5.7 sudo
/// de-elevation) still reads `Elevated` — the proof, not the current euid,
/// is what the gates authorize on.
// [impl->REQ-PAIR-6]
pub fn current() -> Elevation {
    if ELEVATION_PROVEN.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
        return Elevation::Elevated;
    }
    detect()
}

//! OS privilege-elevation gate for the node-bound pairing-code fetch (REQ-PAIR-6).
//!
//! Surfacing a subnet's live TOTP code off a trusted node is the *privileged* fetch
//! path: it hands out subnet-joining authority, so the process must be elevated
//! (Windows UAC / Linux root-or-equivalent). When it is not, we refuse the node-bound
//! fetch and point the user at their authenticator app — where the same seed was
//! provisioned at pairing (the `otpauth://` URI), giving the code without privilege.
//!
//! ## Structure (a thin testable seam over an environment-dependent OS call)
//!
//! [`current`] is the only environment-dependent part: a `cfg`-split OS query that
//! cannot run hermetically in CI (the test process's real euid/token is whatever the
//! runner happens to be). So the *decision* — does this elevation level show the code
//! or fall back? — is factored into [`gate_for`], a pure function unit-tested both
//! ways. An unknown/unsupported platform maps to [`Elevation::Unknown`], which
//! [`gate_for`] treats as NOT elevated: **fail safe** — never leak the code when we
//! cannot positively confirm privilege.
// [impl->REQ-PAIR-6]

/// The process's OS privilege level, as far as we can positively determine it.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Elevation {
    /// Confirmed elevated: Windows token is elevated, or Unix euid == 0.
    Elevated,
    /// Confirmed NOT elevated.
    NotElevated,
    /// Could not determine (unsupported platform, or the OS query failed). Treated as
    /// NOT elevated by [`gate_for`] — we never assume privilege we cannot confirm.
    ///
    /// Constructed only on Windows (an `OpenProcessToken`/`GetTokenInformation`
    /// failure) and on unsupported platforms; on Unix `geteuid` cannot fail, so the
    /// variant is unreachable there. `allow(dead_code)` keeps the fail-safe arm in the
    /// cross-platform API without a per-target warning.
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    Unknown,
}

/// Whether the gated fetch may surface the code, or must fall back to the app.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Gate {
    /// Elevated — render the code + `otpauth://` URI.
    Show,
    /// Not elevated (or undeterminable) — refuse, point at the authenticator app.
    Fallback,
}

/// The pure gate decision (the testable seam). Only a *positively confirmed* elevation
/// shows the code; `NotElevated` and `Unknown` both fall back (fail safe).
// [impl->REQ-PAIR-6]
pub fn gate_for(elevation: Elevation) -> Gate {
    match elevation {
        Elevation::Elevated => Gate::Show,
        Elevation::NotElevated | Elevation::Unknown => Gate::Fallback,
    }
}

/// The fallback guidance shown when the fetch is refused. Names the authenticator app
/// explicitly (the seed was provisioned there at pairing via the `otpauth://` URI), so
/// the user has an unprivileged path to the same code.
pub fn fallback_message(subnet: &str) -> String {
    format!(
        "ELEVATION_REQUIRED: showing the code for subnet '{subnet}' off this node needs an \
         elevated process (run as administrator / root). Without elevation, read the current \
         code from your authenticator app instead — the seed was provisioned there at pairing."
    )
}

/// Query the OS for this process's elevation level. `cfg`-split; an unsupported
/// platform or a failed OS call returns [`Elevation::Unknown`] (→ fail safe).
// [impl->REQ-PAIR-6]
pub fn current() -> Elevation {
    detect()
}

#[cfg(unix)]
fn detect() -> Elevation {
    // Root (euid 0) is the Unix "elevated" equivalent. `geteuid` cannot fail.
    if unsafe { libc::geteuid() } == 0 {
        Elevation::Elevated
    } else {
        Elevation::NotElevated
    }
}

#[cfg(windows)]
fn detect() -> Elevation {
    use core::ffi::c_void;
    use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::{CloseHandle, HANDLE};
    use windows_sys::Win32::Security::{
        GetTokenInformation, TokenElevation, TOKEN_ELEVATION, TOKEN_QUERY,
    };
    use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::{GetCurrentProcess, OpenProcessToken};

    // Open the current process token, query TokenElevation. Any failure → Unknown
    // (fail safe). GetCurrentProcess returns a pseudo-handle we must NOT close; only
    // the opened token handle is released.
    unsafe {
        let mut token: HANDLE = std::ptr::null_mut();
        if OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &mut token) == 0 {
            return Elevation::Unknown;
        }
        let mut info = TOKEN_ELEVATION { TokenIsElevated: 0 };
        let mut ret_len: u32 = 0;
        let ok = GetTokenInformation(
            token,
            TokenElevation,
            &mut info as *mut _ as *mut c_void,
            std::mem::size_of::<TOKEN_ELEVATION>() as u32,
            &mut ret_len,
        );
        CloseHandle(token);
        if ok == 0 {
            Elevation::Unknown
        } else if info.TokenIsElevated != 0 {
            Elevation::Elevated
        } else {
            Elevation::NotElevated
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(not(any(unix, windows)))]
fn detect() -> Elevation {
    // Unsupported platform: we cannot confirm privilege, so refuse to assume it.
    Elevation::Unknown
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    // [unit->REQ-PAIR-6] only confirmed elevation shows the code; NotElevated AND the
    // undeterminable Unknown both fall back (fail safe — no code without proof).
    #[test]
    fn gate_shows_only_when_confirmed_elevated() {
        assert_eq!(gate_for(Elevation::Elevated), Gate::Show);
        assert_eq!(gate_for(Elevation::NotElevated), Gate::Fallback);
        assert_eq!(gate_for(Elevation::Unknown), Gate::Fallback);
    }

    // [unit->REQ-PAIR-6] the fallback names the authenticator app (the unprivileged
    // path to the same code) and the subnet it concerns.
    #[test]
    fn fallback_message_names_authenticator_app_and_subnet() {
        let msg = fallback_message("home fleet");
        assert!(msg.contains("authenticator app"));
        assert!(msg.contains("home fleet"));
    }

    // The live OS probe is environment-dependent (the test runner's own privilege), so
    // we only assert it returns a determinate value here on the supported platforms —
    // the show/fallback *decision* is covered hermetically via `gate_for` above. Real
    // elevated-vs-not end-to-end verification is manual (todlando / D9).
    #[test]
    fn current_returns_a_determinate_level_on_supported_platforms() {
        let e = current();
        if cfg!(any(unix, windows)) {
            assert!(matches!(e, Elevation::Elevated | Elevation::NotElevated));
        }
    }
}

+/// Set when the process **started** elevated and deliberately de-elevated

+/// itself at entry (the sudo-invoker drop, KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7): the user

+/// proved privilege by sudo'ing; dropping to their own identity for state

+/// safety must not also revoke the gate they paid for. Process-local by

+/// design — never an env var, which any unprivileged caller could forge.

+static ELEVATION_PROVEN: std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool =

+    std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false);

+/// Record that elevation was positively confirmed before a deliberate

+/// in-process de-elevation (called ONLY from the main-entry sudo drop).

+    ELEVATION_PROVEN.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);

+/// A process that proved elevation at entry and then dropped (the 5.7 sudo

+/// de-elevation) still reads `Elevated` — the proof, not the current euid,

+    if ELEVATION_PROVEN.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {


fn main() {
    let code = cli::run();
    std::process::exit(code);
}

fn main() {
    // The sudo de-elevation drop (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7) runs BEFORE anything
    // touches state: a sudo'd `spt` otherwise lives in root's universe
    // (sudo flips $HOME, so spt_home — state, node identity, the daemon
    // socket names — all resolve wrong) and roots whatever it writes. Drop
    // to the invoking user (uid/gid/HOME) while keeping the elevation
    // PROOF for the gated commands (`subnet create`/`join`, show-code):
    // the user paid for the gate by sudo'ing; the drop is state safety,
    // not authz revocation. Genuine root (no SUDO_*) is left alone — root's
    // universe IS the invoking user's universe then.
    // [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]
    #[cfg(unix)]
    if let Some(invoker) = spt_daemon::deelevate::sudo_invoker() {
        match invoker.drop_in_process() {
            Ok(()) => {
                elevation::mark_proven();
                eprintln!(
                    "DEELEVATED: running as uid {} (elevation stays proven for gated commands)",
                    invoker.uid
                );
            }
            Err(e) => eprintln!(
                "DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — continuing elevated (state written now may be root-owned)"
            ),
        }
    }
    let code = cli::run();
    std::process::exit(code);
}


The file C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\crates\spt\src\main.rs has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)

fn main() {
    // The sudo de-elevation drop (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7) runs BEFORE anything
    // touches state: a sudo'd `spt` otherwise lives in root's universe
    // (sudo flips $HOME, so spt_home — state, node identity, the daemon
    // socket names — all resolve wrong) and roots whatever it writes. Drop
    // to the invoking user (uid/gid/HOME) while keeping the elevation
    // PROOF for the gated commands (`subnet create`/`join`, show-code):
    // the user paid for the gate by sudo'ing; the drop is state safety,
    // not authz revocation. Genuine root (no SUDO_*) is left alone — root's
    // universe IS the invoking user's universe then.
    // [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]
    #[cfg(unix)]
    if let Some(invoker) = spt_daemon::deelevate::sudo_invoker() {
        match invoker.drop_in_process() {
            Ok(()) => {
                elevation::mark_proven();
                eprintln!(
                    "DEELEVATED: running as uid {} (elevation stays proven for gated commands)",
                    invoker.uid
                );
            }
            Err(e) => eprintln!(
                "DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — continuing elevated (state written now may be root-owned)"
            ),
        }
    }
    let code = cli::run();
    std::process::exit(code);
}

//! `spt` — the single spt-core binary. A **thin** command layer over `spt-msg`:
//! it owns I/O (stdin/stdout/stderr) and process exit codes; all messaging
//! logic lives in the crate (clean-room separation per the M1 plan).
//!
//! Subcommands (REQ-MSG-2 stable surface): `send` · `ring` · `ready` · `poll` ·
//! `list` · `stop` · `whoami`. The harness-contract inbound surface lives under
//! the `api` group (REQ-API-1), dispatched from [`api`].
// [impl->REQ-MSG-2]

mod api;
mod cli;
mod elevation;
mod roster;
mod wansend;

#[cfg(test)]
mod testutil;

fn main() {
    let code = cli::run();
    std::process::exit(code);
}

+    // The sudo de-elevation drop (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7) runs BEFORE anything

+    // touches state: a sudo'd `spt` otherwise lives in root's universe

+    // (sudo flips $HOME, so spt_home — state, node identity, the daemon

+    // socket names — all resolve wrong) and roots whatever it writes. Drop

+    // to the invoking user (uid/gid/HOME) while keeping the elevation

+    // PROOF for the gated commands (`subnet create`/`join`, show-code):

+    // the user paid for the gate by sudo'ing; the drop is state safety,

+    // not authz revocation. Genuine root (no SUDO_*) is left alone — root's

+    // universe IS the invoking user's universe then.

+    // [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]

+    if let Some(invoker) = spt_daemon::deelevate::sudo_invoker() {

+        match invoker.drop_in_process() {

+                elevation::mark_proven();

+                    "DEELEVATED: running as uid {} (elevation stays proven for gated commands)",

+                "DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — continuing elevated (state written now may be root-owned)"


Now the `Daemon::run` entry guard:


    /// Run the daemon: bind the broker (served on a background thread) + the
    /// seed-control channel (the foreground loop + liveness anchor) and serve
    /// until the process is killed. The body of `spt daemon`.
    pub fn run() -> io::Result<()> {
        let reg = Arc::new(SeedRegistry::new());

    /// Run the daemon: bind the broker (served on a background thread) + the
    /// seed-control channel (the foreground loop + liveness anchor) and serve
    /// until the process is killed. The body of `spt daemon`.
    pub fn run() -> io::Result<()> {
        // Entry elevation guard (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7): a DIRECTLY elevated
        // `spt daemon` (sudo / elevated shell) must not serve with the
        // elevated token — its pipes would deny unelevated clients (Windows)
        // or root the user's state universe (Linux). Unix drops privileges
        // in-process before any state is touched; Windows cannot drop a
        // token in-place, so it respawns de-elevated via the UAC linked
        // token and exits (the child re-enters here unelevated). With no
        // unelevated identity to drop to, serving continues as-is, loudly —
        // a consistent universe, never a torn one.
        // [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]
        #[cfg(unix)]
        if let Some(invoker) = crate::deelevate::sudo_invoker() {
            match invoker.drop_in_process() {
                Ok(()) => eprintln!("DEELEVATED: daemon dropped to uid {}", invoker.uid),
                Err(e) => {
                    eprintln!("DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — daemon continues elevated (state may be root-owned)")
                }
            }
        }
        #[cfg(windows)]
        if crate::deelevate::is_elevated() {
            let exe = std::env::current_exe()?;
            match crate::deelevate::spawn_deelevated(
                &exe.to_string_lossy(),
                &["daemon".to_string()],
            ) {
                Ok(Some(pid)) => {
                    eprintln!("DEELEVATED_RESPAWN: unelevated daemon pid {pid}; elevated copy exits");
                    return Ok(());
                }
                Ok(None) => eprintln!(
                    "ELEVATED_DAEMON: no unelevated linked token — serving with the elevated \
                     token (unelevated clients may be denied)"
                ),
                Err(e) => eprintln!(
                    "DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — serving with the elevated token (unelevated clients \
                     may be denied)"
                ),
            }
        }

        let reg = Arc::new(SeedRegistry::new());


    /// Run the daemon: bind the broker (served on a background thread) + the
    /// seed-control channel (the foreground loop + liveness anchor) and serve
    /// until the process is killed. The body of `spt daemon`.
    pub fn run() -> io::Result<()> {
        let reg = Arc::new(SeedRegistry::new());

    /// Run the daemon: bind the broker (served on a background thread) + the
    /// seed-control channel (the foreground loop + liveness anchor) and serve
    /// until the process is killed. The body of `spt daemon`.
    pub fn run() -> io::Result<()> {
        // Entry elevation guard (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7): a DIRECTLY elevated
        // `spt daemon` (sudo / elevated shell) must not serve with the
        // elevated token — its pipes would deny unelevated clients (Windows)
        // or root the user's state universe (Linux). Unix drops privileges
        // in-process before any state is touched; Windows cannot drop a
        // token in-place, so it respawns de-elevated via the UAC linked
        // token and exits (the child re-enters here unelevated). With no
        // unelevated identity to drop to, serving continues as-is, loudly —
        // a consistent universe, never a torn one.
        // [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]
        #[cfg(unix)]
        if let Some(invoker) = crate::deelevate::sudo_invoker() {
            match invoker.drop_in_process() {
                Ok(()) => eprintln!("DEELEVATED: daemon dropped to uid {}", invoker.uid),
                Err(e) => {
                    eprintln!("DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — daemon continues elevated (state may be root-owned)")
                }
            }
        }
        #[cfg(windows)]
        if crate::deelevate::is_elevated() {
            let exe = std::env::current_exe()?;
            match crate::deelevate::spawn_deelevated(
                &exe.to_string_lossy(),
                &["daemon".to_string()],
            ) {
                Ok(Some(pid)) => {
                    eprintln!("DEELEVATED_RESPAWN: unelevated daemon pid {pid}; elevated copy exits");
                    return Ok(());
                }
                Ok(None) => eprintln!(
                    "ELEVATED_DAEMON: no unelevated linked token — serving with the elevated \
                     token (unelevated clients may be denied)"
                ),
                Err(e) => eprintln!(
                    "DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — serving with the elevated token (unelevated clients \
                     may be denied)"
                ),
            }
        }

        let reg = Arc::new(SeedRegistry::new());

+        // Entry elevation guard (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7): a DIRECTLY elevated

+        // `spt daemon` (sudo / elevated shell) must not serve with the

+        // elevated token — its pipes would deny unelevated clients (Windows)

+        // or root the user's state universe (Linux). Unix drops privileges

+        // in-process before any state is touched; Windows cannot drop a

+        // token in-place, so it respawns de-elevated via the UAC linked

+        // token and exits (the child re-enters here unelevated). With no

+        // unelevated identity to drop to, serving continues as-is, loudly —

+        // a consistent universe, never a torn one.

+        // [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]

+        if let Some(invoker) = crate::deelevate::sudo_invoker() {

+            match invoker.drop_in_process() {

+                Ok(()) => eprintln!("DEELEVATED: daemon dropped to uid {}", invoker.uid),

+                    eprintln!("DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — daemon continues elevated (state may be root-owned)")

+        if crate::deelevate::is_elevated() {

+            let exe = std::env::current_exe()?;

+            match crate::deelevate::spawn_deelevated(

+                &exe.to_string_lossy(),

+                &["daemon".to_string()],

+                    eprintln!("DEELEVATED_RESPAWN: unelevated daemon pid {pid}; elevated copy exits");

+                    "ELEVATED_DAEMON: no unelevated linked token — serving with the elevated \

+                     token (unelevated clients may be denied)"

+                    "DEELEVATE_FAIL: {e} — serving with the elevated token (unelevated clients \

// Boot housekeeping (KNOWN-HAZARDS 1.3): sweep stale `index.lock`


Build + test Windows side:


Bash

cd C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core && cargo test -p spt-daemon --lib 2>&1 | tail -8 && cargo test -p spt --bin spt "elevation" 2>&1 | tail -8

Test spt-daemon lib + spt elevation tests


Command running in background with ID: b6quyiz7l. Output is being written to: C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\b6quyiz7l.output. You will be notified when it completes. To check interim output, use Read on that file path.


List installed Rust targets


thumbv6m-none-eabi
x86_64-pc-windows-msvc


rustup target add x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu 2>&1 | tail -2

Add Linux target for cross-check


info: downloading component 'rust-std' for 'x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu'
info: installing component 'rust-std' for 'x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu'


cd C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core && cargo check -p spt-daemon --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu 2>&1 | tail -25

Cross-check spt-daemon unix side


Command running in background with ID: b694g3g34. Output is being written to: C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\b694g3g34.output. You will be notified when it completes. To check interim output, use Read on that file path.


<task-notification>
<task-id>b6quyiz7l</task-id>
<tool-use-id>toolu_012bjUF3hSJv7uvWPREAmtLf</tool-use-id>
<output-file>C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\b6quyiz7l.output</output-file>
<status>completed</status>
<summary>Background command "Test spt-daemon lib + spt elevation tests" completed (exit code 0)</summary>
</task-notification>


<task-notification>
<task-id>b694g3g34</task-id>
<tool-use-id>toolu_019YVmxsoHiBWQHp1XFWtesm</tool-use-id>
<output-file>C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\b694g3g34.output</output-file>
<status>completed</status>
<summary>Background command "Cross-check spt-daemon unix side" completed (exit code 0)</summary>
</task-notification>


Found 1 file
crates\spt-daemon\src\config.rs


Prompt:
<task-notification>
<task-id>b6quyiz7l</task-id>
<tool-use-id>toolu_012bjUF3hSJv7uvWPREAmtLf</tool-use-id>
<output-file>C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\b6quyiz7l.output</output-file>
<status>completed</status>
<summary>Background command "Test spt-daemon lib + spt elevation tests" completed (exit code 0)</summary>
</task-notification>


Prompt:
<task-notification>
<task-id>b694g3g34</task-id>
<tool-use-id>toolu_019YVmxsoHiBWQHp1XFWtesm</tool-use-id>
<output-file>C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\b694g3g34.output</output-file>
<status>completed</status>
<summary>Background command "Cross-check spt-daemon unix side" completed (exit code 0)</summary>
</task-notification>


grep -E "test result|warning|error" "C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/b6quyiz7l.output" | head; echo ---; grep -cE "warning|error" "C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/b694g3g34.output"

Check build/test outputs


test result: ok. 181 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 4.39s
test result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 85 filtered out; finished in 0.00s
---
4


grep -B2 -A8 -E "warning|error" "C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/b694g3g34.output"

Show unix cross-check warnings


  PATH = Some(C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\target\debug\deps;C:\Users\decid\.rustup\toolchains\stable-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc\lib\rustlib\x86_64-pc-windows-msvc\lib;C:\Users\decid\bin;C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin;C:\Program Files\Git\usr\local\bin;C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin;C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin;C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin;C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin;C:\Users\decid\bin;C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7;C:\Program Files\Eclipse Adoptium\jdk-17.0.19.10-hotspot\bin;C:\Program Files\PlasticSCM5\server;C:\Program Files\PlasticSCM5\client;C:\program files\python312\scripts;C:\program files\python312;C:\program files\eclipse adoptium\jre-8.0.392.8-hotspot\bin;C:\WINDOWS\system32;C:\WINDOWS;C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem;C:\WINDOWS\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0;C:\WINDOWS\system32\openssh;C:\program files\putty;C:\program files\microsoft vs code\bin;C:\program files\dotnet;C:\programdata\chocolatey\bin;C:\program files\git\cmd;C:\Program Files\Microsoft VS Code\bin;C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation\NVIDIA app\NvDLISR;C:\WINDOWS\system32;C:\WINDOWS;C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem;C:\WINDOWS\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0;C:\WINDOWS\System32\OpenSSH;C:\Program Files (x86)\NVIDIA Corporation\PhysX\Common;C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\Windows Performance Toolkit;C:\Program Files\USBip;C:\Program Files\PowerToys\DSCModules;C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7;C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\nvm;C:\nvm4w\nodejs;C:\Program Files\GitHub CLI;C:\Users\decid\.local\bin;C:\dev\flutter\bin;C:\Program Files\Tailscale;C:\Users\decid\AppData\Roaming\Python\Python310\Scripts;.;C:\Program Files\Git\Users\decid\AppData\Roaming\Python\Python312\Scripts;C:\Program Files\CMake\bin;C:\Program Files\Arduino CLI;C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Programs\traceable-reqs;C:\Users\decid\.cargo\bin;C:\Users\decid\scoop\apps\mpv\current;C:\Users\decid\scoop\shims;C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps;C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\GitHubDesktop\bin;C:\Users\decid\.dotnet\tools;C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps;C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\nvm;C:\nvm4w\nodejs;C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WinGet\Links;C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WinGet\Packages\ggml.llamacpp_Microsoft.Winget.Source_8wekyb3d8bbwe;C:\Users\decid\.fly\bin;C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\vendor_perl;C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\core_perl;C:\Users\decid\.claude\plugins\cache\claude-plugins-official\frontend-design\unknown\bin;C:\Users\decid\.claude\plugins\cache\claude-plugins-official\rust-analyzer-lsp\1.0.0\bin;C:\Users\decid\.claude\plugins\cache\cplugs\screen-timelapse\1.2.2\bin;C:\Users\decid\.claude\plugins\cache\cplugs\spt\1.11.25\bin;C:\Users\decid\.claude\plugins\cache\caveman\caveman\84cc3c14fa1e\bin;C:\Users\decid\.claude\plugins\cache\cplugs\everything\0.2.0\bin;C:\Users\decid\.rustup\toolchains\stable-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc\bin)
  cargo:rerun-if-env-changed=CC_ENABLE_DEBUG_OUTPUT
  cargo:warning=Compiler family detection failed due to error: ToolNotFound: failed to find tool "x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc": program not found (see https://docs.rs/cc/latest/cc/#compile-time-requirements for help)
  cargo:rerun-if-env-changed=CRATE_CC_NO_DEFAULTS
  CRATE_CC_NO_DEFAULTS = None
  cargo:rerun-if-env-changed=CFLAGS
  CFLAGS = None
  cargo:rerun-if-env-changed=TARGET_CFLAGS
  TARGET_CFLAGS = None
  cargo:rerun-if-env-changed=CFLAGS_x86_64_unknown_linux_gnu
  CFLAGS_x86_64_unknown_linux_gnu = None
  cargo:rerun-if-env-changed=CFLAGS_x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
  CFLAGS_x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu = None
  cargo:warning=Compiler family detection failed due to error: ToolNotFound: failed to find tool "x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc": program not found (see https://docs.rs/cc/latest/cc/#compile-time-requirements for help)

  --- stderr

  error occurred in cc-rs: failed to find tool "x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc": program not found (see https://docs.rs/cc/latest/cc/#compile-time-requirements for help)

warning: build failed, waiting for other jobs to finish...


grep -rn "RUSTFLAGS\|deny\|clippy" C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core/.github/workflows/*.yml | head -20

Check CI lint flags


C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core/.github/workflows/ci.yml:38:      - name: Clippy (deny warnings)
C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core/.github/workflows/ci.yml:39:        run: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings


Edit

/// Record that elevation was positively confirmed before a deliberate
/// in-process de-elevation (called ONLY from the main-entry sudo drop).
pub fn mark_proven() {

/// Record that elevation was positively confirmed before a deliberate
/// in-process de-elevation (called ONLY from the main-entry sudo drop).
/// The drop is unix-only (Windows respawns instead of dropping), so this
/// is uncalled on Windows builds — `allow(dead_code)` keeps the
/// cross-platform API without a per-target warning (the `Unknown` posture).
#[cfg_attr(windows, allow(dead_code))]
pub fn mark_proven() {


/// Record that elevation was positively confirmed before a deliberate
/// in-process de-elevation (called ONLY from the main-entry sudo drop).
/// The drop is unix-only (Windows respawns instead of dropping), so this
/// is uncalled on Windows builds — `allow(dead_code)` keeps the
/// cross-platform API without a per-target warning (the `Unknown` posture).
#[cfg_attr(windows, allow(dead_code))]
pub fn mark_proven() {

//! OS privilege-elevation gate for the node-bound pairing-code fetch (REQ-PAIR-6).
//!
//! Surfacing a subnet's live TOTP code off a trusted node is the *privileged* fetch
//! path: it hands out subnet-joining authority, so the process must be elevated
//! (Windows UAC / Linux root-or-equivalent). When it is not, we refuse the node-bound
//! fetch and point the user at their authenticator app — where the same seed was
//! provisioned at pairing (the `otpauth://` URI), giving the code without privilege.
//!
//! ## Structure (a thin testable seam over an environment-dependent OS call)
//!
//! [`current`] is the only environment-dependent part: a `cfg`-split OS query that
//! cannot run hermetically in CI (the test process's real euid/token is whatever the
//! runner happens to be). So the *decision* — does this elevation level show the code
//! or fall back? — is factored into [`gate_for`], a pure function unit-tested both
//! ways. An unknown/unsupported platform maps to [`Elevation::Unknown`], which
//! [`gate_for`] treats as NOT elevated: **fail safe** — never leak the code when we
//! cannot positively confirm privilege.
// [impl->REQ-PAIR-6]

/// The process's OS privilege level, as far as we can positively determine it.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Elevation {
    /// Confirmed elevated: Windows token is elevated, or Unix euid == 0.
    Elevated,
    /// Confirmed NOT elevated.
    NotElevated,
    /// Could not determine (unsupported platform, or the OS query failed). Treated as
    /// NOT elevated by [`gate_for`] — we never assume privilege we cannot confirm.
    ///
    /// Constructed only on Windows (an `OpenProcessToken`/`GetTokenInformation`
    /// failure) and on unsupported platforms; on Unix `geteuid` cannot fail, so the
    /// variant is unreachable there. `allow(dead_code)` keeps the fail-safe arm in the
    /// cross-platform API without a per-target warning.
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    Unknown,
}

/// Whether the gated fetch may surface the code, or must fall back to the app.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Gate {
    /// Elevated — render the code + `otpauth://` URI.
    Show,
    /// Not elevated (or undeterminable) — refuse, point at the authenticator app.
    Fallback,
}

/// The pure gate decision (the testable seam). Only a *positively confirmed* elevation
/// shows the code; `NotElevated` and `Unknown` both fall back (fail safe).
// [impl->REQ-PAIR-6]
pub fn gate_for(elevation: Elevation) -> Gate {
    match elevation {
        Elevation::Elevated => Gate::Show,
        Elevation::NotElevated | Elevation::Unknown => Gate::Fallback,
    }
}

/// The fallback guidance shown when the fetch is refused. Names the authenticator app
/// explicitly (the seed was provisioned there at pairing via the `otpauth://` URI), so
/// the user has an unprivileged path to the same code.
pub fn fallback_message(subnet: &str) -> String {
    format!(
        "ELEVATION_REQUIRED: showing the code for subnet '{subnet}' off this node needs an \
         elevated process (run as administrator / root). Without elevation, read the current \
         code from your authenticator app instead — the seed was provisioned there at pairing."
    )
}

/// Set when the process **started** elevated and deliberately de-elevated
/// itself at entry (the sudo-invoker drop, KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7): the user
/// proved privilege by sudo'ing; dropping to their own identity for state
/// safety must not also revoke the gate they paid for. Process-local by
/// design — never an env var, which any unprivileged caller could forge.
// [impl->REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN]
static ELEVATION_PROVEN: std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool =
    std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false);

/// Record that elevation was positively confirmed before a deliberate
/// in-process de-elevation (called ONLY from the main-entry sudo drop).
pub fn mark_proven() {
    ELEVATION_PROVEN.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
}

/// Query the OS for this process's elevation level. `cfg`-split; an unsupported
/// platform or a failed OS call returns [`Elevation::Unknown`] (→ fail safe).
/// A process that proved elevation at entry and then dropped (the 5.7 sudo
/// de-elevation) still reads `Elevated` — the proof, not the current euid,
/// is what the gates authorize on.
// [impl->REQ-PAIR-6]
pub fn current() -> Elevation {
    if ELEVATION_PROVEN.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
        return Elevation::Elevated;
    }
    detect()
}

#[cfg(unix)]
fn detect() -> Elevation {
    // Root (euid 0) is the Unix "elevated" equivalent. `geteuid` cannot fail.
    if unsafe { libc::geteuid() } == 0 {
        Elevation::Elevated
    } else {
        Elevation::NotElevated
    }
}

#[cfg(windows)]
fn detect() -> Elevation {
    use core::ffi::c_void;
    use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::{CloseHandle, HANDLE};
    use windows_sys::Win32::Security::{
        GetTokenInformation, TokenElevation, TOKEN_ELEVATION, TOKEN_QUERY,
    };
    use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::{GetCurrentProcess, OpenProcessToken};

    // Open the current process token, query TokenElevation. Any failure → Unknown
    // (fail safe). GetCurrentProcess returns a pseudo-handle we must NOT close; only
    // the opened token handle is released.
    unsafe {
        let mut token: HANDLE = std::ptr::null_mut();
        if OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &mut token) == 0 {
            return Elevation::Unknown;
        }
        let mut info = TOKEN_ELEVATION { TokenIsElevated: 0 };
        let mut ret_len: u32 = 0;
        let ok = GetTokenInformation(
            token,
            TokenElevation,
            &mut info as *mut _ as *mut c_void,
            std::mem::size_of::<TOKEN_ELEVATION>() as u32,
            &mut ret_len,
        );
        CloseHandle(token);
        if ok == 0 {
            Elevation::Unknown
        } else if info.TokenIsElevated != 0 {
            Elevation::Elevated
        } else {
            Elevation::NotElevated
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(not(any(unix, windows)))]
fn detect() -> Elevation {
    // Unsupported platform: we cannot confirm privilege, so refuse to assume it.
    Elevation::Unknown
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    // [unit->REQ-PAIR-6] only confirmed elevation shows the code; NotElevated AND the
    // undeterminable Unknown both fall back (fail safe — no code without proof).
    #[test]
    fn gate_shows_only_when_confirmed_elevated() {
        assert_eq!(gate_for(Elevation::Elevated), Gate::Show);
        assert_eq!(gate_for(Elevation::NotElevated), Gate::Fallback);
        assert_eq!(gate_for(Elevation::Unknown), Gate::Fallback);
    }

    // [unit->REQ-PAIR-6] the fallback names the authenticator app (the unprivileged
    // path to the same code) and the subnet it concerns.
    #[test]
    fn fallback_message_names_authenticator_app_and_subnet() {
        let msg = fallback_message("home fleet");
        assert!(msg.contains("authenticator app"));
        assert!(msg.contains("home fleet"));
    }

    // The live OS probe is environment-dependent (the test runner's own privilege), so
    // we only assert it returns a determinate value here on the supported platforms —
    // the show/fallback *decision* is covered hermetically via `gate_for` above. Real
    // elevated-vs-not end-to-end verification is manual (todlando / D9).
    #[test]
    fn current_returns_a_determinate_level_on_supported_platforms() {
        let e = current();
        if cfg!(any(unix, windows)) {
            assert!(matches!(e, Elevation::Elevated | Elevation::NotElevated));
        }
    }
}

+/// The drop is unix-only (Windows respawns instead of dropping), so this

+/// is uncalled on Windows builds — `allow(dead_code)` keeps the

+/// cross-platform API without a per-target warning (the `Unknown` posture).


Bash

cd C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core && cargo clippy -p spt-net -p spt-daemon -p spt --all-targets 2>&1 | grep -E "warning|error" | grep -v "generated" | head -20; echo CLIPPY_DONE

Clippy changed crates


Command running in background with ID: b2d34o8ao. Output is being written to: C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\b2d34o8ao.output. You will be notified when it completes. To check interim output, use Read on that file path.


<task-notification>
<task-id>b2d34o8ao</task-id>
<tool-use-id>toolu_01NGMLJcGNdBWwTezALznKHX</tool-use-id>
<output-file>C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\b2d34o8ao.output</output-file>
<status>completed</status>
<summary>Background command "Clippy changed crates" completed (exit code 0)</summary>
</task-notification>


While clippy runs — DEFERRED.md rows flip:


Edit

| **Non-admin daemon spawn (both OSes) — M7-blocking, next session**: the daemon must ALWAYS run unelevated in the invoking user's universe regardless of which command spawns it. Windows face: an elevated `subnet create` auto-starts an ELEVATED daemon whose named pipes deny unelevated clients — every later `spt` reads "not running", tries to spawn, gets bind Access-denied (hit live). Linux face: a sudo'd command spawns a root daemon / root-owned state in the user's home. Fix directions: de-elevated spawn (Windows: launch via the unelevated shell/explorer token; Linux: drop to SUDO_UID) and/or pipe security descriptors granting the user session | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | The membership-implies-reachability activation made elevated commands daemon-spawners — correct goal, wrong token | NEXT SESSION (publish-blocking) |
| **Ghost registry row eviction — M7-blocking, next session**: rows from a dead node identity persist (no TTL/eviction; only the epoch lease per (endpoint,node) supersedes) and poison bare-id resolution with phantom AcrossNodes ambiguity. Hit live: gravity paired under TWO identities (09ef…, then 03854a… after its node.key universe flipped during the sudo experiments) — both trust-pinned, the dead one's sergey row lingered in snapshots | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | Needs a decay/eviction policy (e.g. drop rows unrefreshed for N pump cadences; trust-row pruning verb) | NEXT SESSION (publish-blocking) |
| AMBIGUOUS render: `AcrossNodes([..hex..])` debug-dump is noise — resolution refusals should print the VALID QUALIFIED TARGETS to copy-paste (`sergey@gravity-linux`, `sergey@03854a12`), labels preferred (REQ-SUBNET-3 made them addressable) | M7 acceptance run (user 2026-06-06) | Pure render fix at the wansend/CLI boundary; carries into the M8 nounification sweep | M8 |

| ~~**Non-admin daemon spawn (both OSes)**~~ **SHIPPED 2026-06-06** (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7, REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN): de-elevated spawn at `spawn_detached` (Windows: UAC linked token via `CreateProcessWithTokenW`; Linux: drop child to SUDO_UID/GID) + `Daemon::run` entry guard + the unix `spt` main-entry sudo drop (whole process re-anchored to the invoker's universe, elevation kept PROVEN for the gated commands). Remaining Linux follow-up = the install-symlink + default-account election row below (M8) | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | The membership-implies-reachability activation made elevated commands daemon-spawners — correct goal, wrong token | DONE (real elevated-spawn verification on both OSes rides the next acceptance pass) |
| ~~**Ghost registry row eviction**~~ **SHIPPED 2026-06-06** (KNOWN-HAZARDS 4.10, REQ-HAZARD-REGISTRY-GHOST-ROWS): silent-peer decay — rows from a node unheard for `registry_evict_after_ms` (default 300s ≈ 10 pump cadences) evict on the registry pump tick, snapshots rewritten; own rows never decay. STALE trust rows for a dead identity still need a manual prune verb (below) | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | Needs a decay/eviction policy (e.g. drop rows unrefreshed for N pump cadences; trust-row pruning verb) | DONE (fleet cleanup: 09ef831e ghost rows on both BIGNET nodes decay once the new build deploys) |
| Trust-row prune verb (`spt subnet prune <node>` or similar): registry GHOST rows now decay (4.10), but the dead identity's TRUST rows persist by design (trust is a user decision) — they cost dead dials every pump tick and clutter status views. BIGNET carries two such rows (09ef831e, both sides) | Ghost-eviction fix (2026-06-06) | Trust mutation = security surface; wants the elevation gate + the M8 noun shapes | M8 CLI nounification |
| ~~AMBIGUOUS render~~ **SHIPPED 2026-06-06** (rode the ghost-eviction fix): resolution refusals render valid copy-paste targets at the wansend boundary (`render_refusal`) — labels preferred, key-prefix on label collision, `subnet:id` for cross-subnet | M7 acceptance run (user 2026-06-06) | Pure render fix at the wansend/CLI boundary; carries into the M8 nounification sweep | DONE |


The file C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\docs\DEFERRED.md has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)

| **Non-admin daemon spawn (both OSes) — M7-blocking, next session**: the daemon must ALWAYS run unelevated in the invoking user's universe regardless of which command spawns it. Windows face: an elevated `subnet create` auto-starts an ELEVATED daemon whose named pipes deny unelevated clients — every later `spt` reads "not running", tries to spawn, gets bind Access-denied (hit live). Linux face: a sudo'd command spawns a root daemon / root-owned state in the user's home. Fix directions: de-elevated spawn (Windows: launch via the unelevated shell/explorer token; Linux: drop to SUDO_UID) and/or pipe security descriptors granting the user session | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | The membership-implies-reachability activation made elevated commands daemon-spawners — correct goal, wrong token | NEXT SESSION (publish-blocking) |
| **Ghost registry row eviction — M7-blocking, next session**: rows from a dead node identity persist (no TTL/eviction; only the epoch lease per (endpoint,node) supersedes) and poison bare-id resolution with phantom AcrossNodes ambiguity. Hit live: gravity paired under TWO identities (09ef…, then 03854a… after its node.key universe flipped during the sudo experiments) — both trust-pinned, the dead one's sergey row lingered in snapshots | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | Needs a decay/eviction policy (e.g. drop rows unrefreshed for N pump cadences; trust-row pruning verb) | NEXT SESSION (publish-blocking) |
| AMBIGUOUS render: `AcrossNodes([..hex..])` debug-dump is noise — resolution refusals should print the VALID QUALIFIED TARGETS to copy-paste (`sergey@gravity-linux`, `sergey@03854a12`), labels preferred (REQ-SUBNET-3 made them addressable) | M7 acceptance run (user 2026-06-06) | Pure render fix at the wansend/CLI boundary; carries into the M8 nounification sweep | M8 |

| ~~**Non-admin daemon spawn (both OSes)**~~ **SHIPPED 2026-06-06** (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7, REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN): de-elevated spawn at `spawn_detached` (Windows: UAC linked token via `CreateProcessWithTokenW`; Linux: drop child to SUDO_UID/GID) + `Daemon::run` entry guard + the unix `spt` main-entry sudo drop (whole process re-anchored to the invoker's universe, elevation kept PROVEN for the gated commands). Remaining Linux follow-up = the install-symlink + default-account election row below (M8) | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | The membership-implies-reachability activation made elevated commands daemon-spawners — correct goal, wrong token | DONE (real elevated-spawn verification on both OSes rides the next acceptance pass) |
| ~~**Ghost registry row eviction**~~ **SHIPPED 2026-06-06** (KNOWN-HAZARDS 4.10, REQ-HAZARD-REGISTRY-GHOST-ROWS): silent-peer decay — rows from a node unheard for `registry_evict_after_ms` (default 300s ≈ 10 pump cadences) evict on the registry pump tick, snapshots rewritten; own rows never decay. STALE trust rows for a dead identity still need a manual prune verb (below) | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | Needs a decay/eviction policy (e.g. drop rows unrefreshed for N pump cadences; trust-row pruning verb) | DONE (fleet cleanup: 09ef831e ghost rows on both BIGNET nodes decay once the new build deploys) |
| Trust-row prune verb (`spt subnet prune <node>` or similar): registry GHOST rows now decay (4.10), but the dead identity's TRUST rows persist by design (trust is a user decision) — they cost dead dials every pump tick and clutter status views. BIGNET carries two such rows (09ef831e, both sides) | Ghost-eviction fix (2026-06-06) | Trust mutation = security surface; wants the elevation gate + the M8 noun shapes | M8 CLI nounification |
| ~~AMBIGUOUS render~~ **SHIPPED 2026-06-06** (rode the ghost-eviction fix): resolution refusals render valid copy-paste targets at the wansend boundary (`render_refusal`) — labels preferred, key-prefix on label collision, `subnet:id` for cross-subnet | M7 acceptance run (user 2026-06-06) | Pure render fix at the wansend/CLI boundary; carries into the M8 nounification sweep | DONE |

| Subnet attachment verbs: `spt subnet detach <NAME> [--auto]` / `attach <NAME> [--auto]` (daemon keeps running, stops/starts advertising + connecting for that subnet; `--auto` persists the startup default), `spt subnet leave <NAME>` (elevation-gated), maybe `spt subnet disband <NAME>` (elevation + current TOTP) | M7 grill (user spec 2026-06-06; CONTEXT §subnet attachment) | The attached/detached *term* + the all-attached banner ship M7; the per-subnet serve-state machinery (selective advertise/connect, persisted flags) is its own deliverable | M8 CLI nounification, or first multi-subnet user needing selective participation |

| Linux elevation model (user-ratified direction 2026-06-06): (1) install symlinks the binary into a sudo-reachable path (e.g. `/usr/local/bin`) so `sudo spt` resolves; (2) first `sudo spt` detects elevation and prompts once for the DEFAULT USER ACCOUNT — thereafter any `sudo spt` daemon launch always runs the daemon (and state) under that account, never root (kills the `sudo HOME=$HOME` dance and the root-owned-state hazard) | M7 acceptance run (gravity: `sudo: spt: command not found`, then the HOME-universe split) | Needs installer + first-run-state design; Windows elevation has no equivalent problem (same user profile) | M8, with the installer's next touch |

| Windows firewall registration for the installed binary: a DETACHED daemon never shows the first-bind firewall prompt, so inbound UDP (mDNS + QUIC meet/pairing) is silently dropped — found as the M7 acceptance NO_SEED_HOLDER (dev/test paths had accumulated allow rules; the install path had none). Options: an elevated install leg adds the rule (`New-NetFirewallRule`), and/or the daemon self-detects blocked inbound and renders it as the "no connection" state in `subnet status` + the coming-online banner | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | User-scope installer is deliberately non-OS-entangled (REQ-INSTALL-2); needs the elevated-install / OS-service design anyway | M8, with the OS-service + Linux-elevation install work |

-| **Non-admin daemon spawn (both OSes) — M7-blocking, next session**: the daemon must ALWAYS run unelevated in the invoking user's universe regardless of which command spawns it. Windows face: an elevated `subnet create` auto-starts an ELEVATED daemon whose named pipes deny unelevated clients — every later `spt` reads "not running", tries to spawn, gets bind Access-denied (hit live). Linux face: a sudo'd command spawns a root daemon / root-owned state in the user's home. Fix directions: de-elevated spawn (Windows: launch via the unelevated shell/explorer token; Linux: drop to SUDO_UID) and/or pipe security descriptors granting the user session | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | The membership-implies-reachability activation made elevated commands daemon-spawners — correct goal, wrong token | NEXT SESSION (publish-blocking) |

-| **Ghost registry row eviction — M7-blocking, next session**: rows from a dead node identity persist (no TTL/eviction; only the epoch lease per (endpoint,node) supersedes) and poison bare-id resolution with phantom AcrossNodes ambiguity. Hit live: gravity paired under TWO identities (09ef…, then 03854a… after its node.key universe flipped during the sudo experiments) — both trust-pinned, the dead one's sergey row lingered in snapshots | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | Needs a decay/eviction policy (e.g. drop rows unrefreshed for N pump cadences; trust-row pruning verb) | NEXT SESSION (publish-blocking) |

-| AMBIGUOUS render: `AcrossNodes([..hex..])` debug-dump is noise — resolution refusals should print the VALID QUALIFIED TARGETS to copy-paste (`sergey@gravity-linux`, `sergey@03854a12`), labels preferred (REQ-SUBNET-3 made them addressable) | M7 acceptance run (user 2026-06-06) | Pure render fix at the wansend/CLI boundary; carries into the M8 nounification sweep | M8 |

+| ~~**Non-admin daemon spawn (both OSes)**~~ **SHIPPED 2026-06-06** (KNOWN-HAZARDS 5.7, REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN): de-elevated spawn at `spawn_detached` (Windows: UAC linked token via `CreateProcessWithTokenW`; Linux: drop child to SUDO_UID/GID) + `Daemon::run` entry guard + the unix `spt` main-entry sudo drop (whole process re-anchored to the invoker's universe, elevation kept PROVEN for the gated commands). Remaining Linux follow-up = the install-symlink + default-account election row below (M8) | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | The membership-implies-reachability activation made elevated commands daemon-spawners — correct goal, wrong token | DONE (real elevated-spawn verification on both OSes rides the next acceptance pass) |

+| ~~**Ghost registry row eviction**~~ **SHIPPED 2026-06-06** (KNOWN-HAZARDS 4.10, REQ-HAZARD-REGISTRY-GHOST-ROWS): silent-peer decay — rows from a node unheard for `registry_evict_after_ms` (default 300s ≈ 10 pump cadences) evict on the registry pump tick, snapshots rewritten; own rows never decay. STALE trust rows for a dead identity still need a manual prune verb (below) | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | Needs a decay/eviction policy (e.g. drop rows unrefreshed for N pump cadences; trust-row pruning verb) | DONE (fleet cleanup: 09ef831e ghost rows on both BIGNET nodes decay once the new build deploys) |

+| Trust-row prune verb (`spt subnet prune <node>` or similar): registry GHOST rows now decay (4.10), but the dead identity's TRUST rows persist by design (trust is a user decision) — they cost dead dials every pump tick and clutter status views. BIGNET carries two such rows (09ef831e, both sides) | Ghost-eviction fix (2026-06-06) | Trust mutation = security surface; wants the elevation gate + the M8 noun shapes | M8 CLI nounification |

+| ~~AMBIGUOUS render~~ **SHIPPED 2026-06-06** (rode the ghost-eviction fix): resolution refusals render valid copy-paste targets at the wansend boundary (`render_refusal`) — labels preferred, key-prefix on label collision, `subnet:id` for cross-subnet | M7 acceptance run (user 2026-06-06) | Pure render fix at the wansend/CLI boundary; carries into the M8 nounification sweep | DONE |

| Post-join address seeding: the pairing ceremony holds a live, authenticated connection to the peer, but the peer pumps then re-find each other from scratch via id-only discovery (fresh node ids must propagate to n0 DNS first) — observed live as ~1 min to first `status --nodes` convergence after a join. Seed the pump's address cache from the ceremony connection (both sides) for instant first sync | M7 acceptance run (2026-06-06) | Convergence is correct, just slow on first contact; needs an addr-cache seam the pumps consult before the resolver | M8 polish |

| Clock source priority for TOTP/rendezvous: query a well-known world clock (NTP) FIRST, fall back to local time — machines with skewed local clocks currently derive wrong steps/rendezvous tokens silently | M7 acceptance grill (user 2026-06-06) | Needs an NTP client dep + offset caching + offline fallback semantics; ±1 window covers small skew today | First field report of clock-skew join failures, or M8 polish |

| CLI nounification (M8 candidate; ratified shape from the 2026-06-06 grill): `spt endpoint` namespace absorbs fork/suspend/wake/shutdown/rename/stop/digest + `access` (per-endpoint store — NOT subnet-scoped) + `description` (ex-`resources` blurb; bare = show, `set` = author); `spt endpoint list [--local\|--subnet <name>]` = merged listing, default all-subnets grouped by subnet, SELF endpoint pinned distinctly at top (bare `spt endpoint` = this list); agent HOT PATH stays flat (`send`/`ring`/`ready`/`whoami`/`how-to`); `notify` → `spt subnet notify`; `notif` stays top-level (user-recall, cross-subnet); `spt daemon stop\|status` noun (hidden `daemon` → `daemon run`); agent-endpoint `shutdown` keeps its name | M7 grill (2026-06-06) | Second surface-breaking reorg mid-acceptance; adapter window still open immediately after M7 closes | M8 planning — mint REQs first (rule 3) |


Prompt:
<task-notification>
<task-id>b2d34o8ao</task-id>
<tool-use-id>toolu_01NGMLJcGNdBWwTezALznKHX</tool-use-id>
<output-file>C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\b2d34o8ao.output</output-file>
<status>completed</status>
<summary>Background command "Clippy changed crates" completed (exit code 0)</summary>
</task-notification>


Bash

Show clippy output


warning: the borrowed expression implements the required traits
CLIPPY_DONE


Fix 2: Ghost registry row eviction


cd C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core && cargo clippy -p spt-net -p spt-daemon -p spt --all-targets 2>&1 | grep -B3 -A8 "borrowed expression" | head -25

Locate clippy warning


warning: the borrowed expression implements the required traits
   --> crates\spt-daemon\src\registryhost.rs:378:37
    |
378 |             let n = reg.evict_nodes(&silent);
    |                                     ^^^^^^^ help: change this to: `silent`
    |
    = help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/rust-1.93.0/index.html#needless_borrows_for_generic_args
    = note: `#[warn(clippy::needless_borrows_for_generic_args)]` on by default


The file C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\crates\spt-daemon\src\registryhost.rs has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context — no need to Read it back)

let mut regs = self.regs.lock().unwrap();

-            let n = reg.evict_nodes(&silent);

+            let n = reg.evict_nodes(silent);

eprintln!("REGISTRY_EVICT:{subnet}: {n} row(s) from silent node(s)");


cd C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core && cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings 2>&1 | tail -5 && traceable-reqs check 2>&1 | tail -15

Workspace clippy + traceability check


Command running in background with ID: bpd03bfp2. Output is being written to: C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\bpd03bfp2.output. You will be notified when it completes. To check interim output, use Read on that file path.


<task-notification>
<task-id>bpd03bfp2</task-id>
<tool-use-id>toolu_013oA5CTgbF1ffW2BurH5APo</tool-use-id>
<output-file>C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\bpd03bfp2.output</output-file>
<status>completed</status>
<summary>Background command "Workspace clippy + traceability check" completed (exit code 0)</summary>
</task-notification>


git -C C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core status --short

Show working tree changes


 M Cargo.lock
 M crates/spt-daemon/Cargo.toml
 M crates/spt-daemon/src/config.rs
 M crates/spt-daemon/src/daemon.rs
 M crates/spt-daemon/src/lib.rs
 M crates/spt-daemon/src/peerloop.rs
 M crates/spt-daemon/src/registryhost.rs
 M crates/spt-daemon/tests/peerloop.rs
 M crates/spt-daemon/tests/twohost.rs
 M crates/spt-net/src/net/registry.rs
 M crates/spt/src/cli.rs
 M crates/spt/src/elevation.rs
 M crates/spt/src/main.rs
 M crates/spt/src/wansend.rs
 M docs/DEFERRED.md
 M docs/KNOWN-HAZARDS.md
 M traceable-reqs.toml
?? crates/spt-daemon/src/deelevate.rs


Prompt:
<task-notification>
<task-id>bpd03bfp2</task-id>
<tool-use-id>toolu_013oA5CTgbF1ffW2BurH5APo</tool-use-id>
<output-file>C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\bpd03bfp2.output</output-file>
<status>completed</status>
<summary>Background command "Workspace clippy + traceability check" completed (exit code 0)</summary>
</task-notification>


Show clippy + check results


    Checking mock-adapter v0.1.0 (C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\adapters\mock)
    Checking spt-daemon v0.1.0 (C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\crates\spt-daemon)
    Checking spt v0.1.0 (C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\crates\spt)
    Checking xtask v0.1.0 (C:\Users\decid\Documents\projects\spt-core\crates\xtask)
    Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 7.06s
       session-surface abstraction; send-keys + send-line injection
  [OK] REQ-TERM-3  required: [impl, unit]  stages: -doc +impl +unit -int
       Byte-stream remote terminal streaming for v1
  [OK] REQ-TERM-4  required: [impl, unit, int]  stages: +doc +impl +unit +int
       Live activity buffer (PTY digest): adapter-supplied patterns over broker PTY, spt digest pull + delta-stream, opt-in Path-B log
  [OK] REQ-UPD-1  required: [impl, unit, int]  stages: -doc +impl +unit +int
       Peer-propagated update over P2P
  [OK] REQ-UPD-2  required: [impl, unit]  stages: -doc +impl +unit -int
       All binaries signature-verified before handoff
  [OK] REQ-UPD-3  required: [impl, unit, int]  stages: -doc +impl +unit +int
       No endpoint process terminates/suspends during self-update
  [OK] REQ-UPD-4  required: [impl, unit]  stages: -doc +impl +unit -int
       Update gated on user confirmation by default; opt-in full-auto
  [OK] REQ-UPD-5  required: [impl, unit]  stages: -doc +impl +unit -int
       spt-core ripple-updates registered adapters


cd C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core && traceable-reqs check 2>&1 | grep -E "HAZARD-ELEVATED|HAZARD-REGISTRY-GHOST|FAIL|missing|exit" ; echo EXIT=$?

Verify new reqs covered


  [OK] REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN  required: [doc, impl, unit]  stages: +doc +impl +unit -int
       Ephemeral perch cleanup on every ring exit path (3.1)
  [OK] REQ-HAZARD-REGISTRY-GHOST-ROWS  required: [doc, impl, unit]  stages: +doc +impl +unit -int
       spt binary CLI surface: send/ring/ready(+--once)/list/stop/whoami, stable arg shapes + exit codes
       Shell sleep/wake: link-break always closes the binary (pre-close instruction + termination timeout), ephemeral teardown vs persistent offline/relink, wake_command wake-watcher (offline-only, exit-opcode supervision, exponential backoff + give-up), state-keyed wake resolution (dormant/suspended/active-elsewhere; no-reachable refuses — spawn-anywhere branch deferred), spt shutdown owner cascade + api owner-shutdown gated by can_shutdown (CONTEXT Shell sleep/wake)
EXIT=0


Clippy clean, traceability green, both new reqs ✅. Full workspace test before commit:


cd C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core && cargo test --workspace 2>&1 | grep -E "test result|FAILED|panicked|error\[" | tail -40

Full workspace test run


Command running in background with ID: bsro82t7g. Output is being written to: C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\bsro82t7g.output. You will be notified when it completes. To check interim output, use Read on that file path.


While tests run — check the project's commit trailer:


git -C C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core log -1 --format=%B 5c0db0d

Show recent commit message format


fix(cli): [twohost] human-readable join epilogue + first-sync honesty

From the user's first fully-guided join (which worked):

- "(Pinned)" was the TrustOutcome debug leak — now translated: "This
  machine and the member that answered now recognize and trust each
  other." (AlreadyTrusted gets its own line; KeyChanged never reaches
  this path — the ceremony surfaces it before trust writes.)
- "shows the fleet as gossip lands" jargon replaced with what actually
  happens, including the honest first-sync latency ("can take a
  minute") — observed live: first status convergence after a join is
  ~1 min because the pumps re-find the freshly-paired peer via id-only
  discovery (n0 DNS propagation) instead of seeding from the ceremony
  connection. That improvement is logged in DEFERRED (post-join address
  seeding).

[twohost] tag: the rig also blesses the 4b2b083 rendezvous fixes
(raced bounded meet probes, window overlap, sweep deadline) which the
live two-machine acceptance already proved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>


sleep 60; tail -5 "C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/bsro82t7g.output" 2>/dev/null; echo ---PEEK---

Peek test progress


<tool_use_error>Blocked: sleep 60 followed by: tail -5 "C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/bsro82t7g.output" echo ---PEEK---. To wait for a condition, use Monitor with an until-loop (e.g. `until <check>; do sleep 2; done`). To wait for a command you started, use run_in_background: true. Do not chain shorter sleeps to work around this block.</tool_use_error>

Error: Blocked: sleep 60 followed by: tail -5 "C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/bsro82t7g.output" echo ---PEEK---. To wait for a condition, use Monitor with an until-loop (e.g. `until <check>; do sleep 2; done`). To wait for a command you started, use run_in_background: true. Do not chain shorter sleeps to work around this block.


grep -E "test result: FAILED|panicked" "C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/bsro82t7g.output" | head -5; grep -c "test result: ok" "C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/bsro82t7g.output"

Interim test status


Check output file state


0 C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/bsro82t7g.output


Suite still running (grep buffers until done). Holding for the notification before committing.


ScheduleWakeup

workspace test suite running in background; resume to commit the three fixes once green

Prompt: proceed with bug rca and fixes — workspace test suite was running in background (task bsro82t7g); check its result, then commit the staged work in 5 slices as planned


Next wakeup scheduled for 04:50:00 (in 230s). Nothing more to do this turn — the harness re-invokes you when the wakeup fires or a task-notification arrives.


Holding — suite runs, wakeup armed.


<task-notification>
<task-id>bsro82t7g</task-id>
<tool-use-id>toolu_01746daPDVfTPZWxRorQeMWU</tool-use-id>
<output-file>C:\Users\decid\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core\648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d\tasks\bsro82t7g.output</output-file>
<status>completed</status>
<summary>Background command "Full workspace test run" completed (exit code 0)</summary>
</task-notification>


<owl_reachability_notice>
You have an active owl perch. When spawning subagents or doing work, use run_in_background: true so you stay reachable for incoming messages.
</owl_reachability_notice>


CAVEMAN MODE ACTIVE (full). Drop articles/filler/pleasantries/hedging. Fragments OK. Code/commits/security: write normal.


Bash

grep -E "test result" "C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/bsro82t7g.output" | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head; grep -E "FAILED|failed" "C:/Users/decid/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Users-decid-Documents-projects-spt-core/648159b6-16b2-4568-b643-7b0c98c1871d/tasks/bsro82t7g.output" | grep -v "0 failed" | head

Summarize workspace test results


      9 test result: ok. 0 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.00s
      2 test result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.40s
      2 test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.15s
      1 test result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 2.90s
      1 test result: ok. 8 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.01s
      1 test result: ok. 54 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.04s
      1 test result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.08s
      1 test result: ok. 49 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 5.42s
      1 test result: ok. 4 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.59s
      1 test result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 3.60s


Workspace suite fully green (exit 0, zero failures). Committing in slices:


cd C:/Users/decid/Documents/projects/spt-core && git add traceable-reqs.toml docs/KNOWN-HAZARDS.md && git commit -m "docs(reqs): register KH 4.10 ghost-rows + 5.7 elevated-spawn hazards (rule 3)

The M7 acceptance run's two publish-blocking field bugs become tracked
hazards before their fixes land:

- 4.10 / REQ-HAZARD-REGISTRY-GHOST-ROWS: a dead node identity's registry
  rows are immortal (only the epoch lease supersedes, and only same-node)
  and poison bare-id resolution with phantom AcrossNodes ambiguity. Hit
  live: gravity's retired 09ef… identity kept a sergey row that made
  bare 'spt send sergey' refuse on HFENDULEAM.

- 5.7 / REQ-HAZARD-ELEVATED-DAEMON-SPAWN: membership-implies-reachability
  made elevated commands daemon spawners with the wrong token — an
  elevated daemon's pipes deny unelevated clients (Windows, hit live);
  a sudo'd spawn roots the daemon and flips the state universe (Linux,
  the very key-flip that produced the 4.10 ghosts).

Both rows activated doc+impl+unit; conformance checklist updated (also
backfills the missing 5.6 row).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>"

Commit A: hazard/req registration


warning: in the working copy of 'docs/KNOWN-HAZARDS.md', LF will be replaced by CRLF the next time Git touches it
[dev-freeform fc745d0] docs(reqs): register KH 4.10 ghost-rows + 5.7 elevated-spawn hazards (rule 3)
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)